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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Dr. Earl O. Heady in the 1950s and 1960s proposed an alternative 
agricultural program he called the "Positive Sum Concept". He based his 
program on his definition of the agricultural problem. Unlike the 
government which defined the problem as excessive surplus caused by 
increased productivity which led to low net farm income, Heady viewed the 
problem as a lack of adjustment by farmers to the new agricultural 
technology they had adopted. This lack of adjustment caused the excessive 
surpluses that depressed commodity prices and thus farm income. To 
overcome this problem, Heady proposed a government land purchasing 
program to remove enough land from crop production on a permanent basis 
to bring commodity production into balance with demand. For the farm 
families displaced by this program, Heady proposed a retraining and 
relocation program. Unfortunately, Heady's program overlooked long-held 
American beliefs surrounding land ownership, the political environment, 
and what seems particularly peculiar for one in his position, the continuing 
growth in productivity per acre of many crops. One is forced to conclude 
that Heady seemed to be more enthralled with the use of linear 
programming than with the feasibility of the results in projecting cost and 
effect of proposed agricultural programs. As a result Heady's proposal had 
little impact on policy makers. 
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CHAPTER 1WO: TRADmONAL FARM POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 
The problem of surpluses and low income had its roots early in American 
history with the distribution of land, much of which went into crop 
production: and since the 1860s, with federal support of agricultural 
education, which resulted in improved farming practices and adoption of 
technology. The result was ever increasing productivity. By the 1920s 
productivity and market changes resulted in low prices and led some 
agricultural interests to demand the government help to sustain or raise 
farm income .. The arguments in the 1920s over the role of government in 
agriculture and over the McNary-Haugen bill influenced Congress in the 
1930s as it respond to the Depression and created programs to raise farm 
prices. The 1930s thinking about the "farm problem" guided the discussion 
about farm programs through the 1960s and still had some effect in the 
1990s. A key element of the farm program was the price support system 
utilizing acreage restrictions, price support loans, subsidized sales, and 
-marketing orders. The government, through the Department of Agriculture, 
land-grant universities, and the extension service also encouraged research 
and development of new agricultural technology and more effiCient methods 
of farming. While the early price support program was aimed at raising 
prices by reducing output, the activities of the Department of Agriculture 
and the land-grant universities. the extension service, and chemical and 
equipment manufacturers. increased productivity. So even with fewer acres 
planted surpluses continued. By the 1960s, this resulted in a situation 
where the number of fanns declined as small scale fanners were forced out 
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of business, and production and income continued to concentrate in the 
hands of ever fewer commercial farmers. Table 2.1 shows the decline in the 
number of farms from 1910 when the United States had 6.5 million to the 3 
million farms in the 1970s. Table 2.2 displays the distribution of net farm 
income by sales class for 1968. In that year, 31.5 percent of the farms in 
the United States had 85 percent of cash receipts; over half of the farms by 
Census definition had sales of less than $5,000 per fann. l 
The trend towards fewer farms and farmers was far from the minds of the 
generation after the Revolutionary War. Instead the new states and the 
national government embarked on a land policy which increased the number 
offanns by making land readily available. Early land laws of both state and 
federal governments were aimed at rewarding Revolutionary War veterans 
and paying off the war debts by selling land. The states began this during 
the Revolutionary War. First they eliminated feudal fonns of land-
holding, then they moved to distribute land to private interests as quickly 
as possible. The New England states, wanted to encourage small fann 
communities so they sold small tracts at low prices which undercut 
somewhat the intention of paying off war debts. These state land poliCies 
influenced first the Confederation and then the federal land poliCies. The 
land poliCies continued to encourage the small family farm as the typical 
unit. These small units were best suited for farming as it was in the late 
18th centwy and much of the 19th centwy but with the accelerating pace 
of improvements in agricultural technology and the expansion in land size 
of the typical fann, small scale farmers and their farms struggled to remain 
4 
Table 2.1 Number of farms and average (ann income per farm1930-
1970 
Year Number Total Production Operators 
of Farms Realized Expense Per Total Net 
1.000 Gross Farm Income 
Income Ca) PerFann 
Per Farm 
Dollars 
1910 6.362 1.155 567 700 
1920 6.448 2.467 1.416 1.300 
1930 6.546 1,753 1.061 651 
1935 6,814 1,423 751 411 
1940 6,350. 1,742 1,080 706 
1945 5,967 4,326 2,189 2,063 
1950 5,648 5,718 3,445 2,417 
1955 4,654 7,147 4,764 2,429 
1960 3,963 9,715 6,919 2,896 
1965 3.356 13,561 9,988 3,883 
1970 2,954 19,838 15,088 4,752 
a) This figure includes: cash receipts from marketings, government payments, realized and 
nonmoney and other fann income. 
Figures and beadings taken from Chart 60 in the July 1974 issue of Farm Income Situation. 
FIS 224 and the Agricultural Statistics 1942 (Washington, D.C.: GPO 1942). 
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Table 2.2 Fanns, Cash Receipts, and Net Fann Income by Sales Classes, 
1968 
Cash Receipts Realized Net Fanns 
Income 
Fanns Amount Total Amount 'Total Number Per 
With Million Receipts Million Net (1,000) Total 
Sales Dollars Percentages Dollars Percentage Fanns 
Of: 
$10,000 39,011 85.1 10,544 74.1 993 31.5 
and over 
$5,000 3,724 8.1 1,599 11.2 446 14.2 
to 
$9,999 
Under 3,132 6.8 2,098 14.7 1,707 54.3 
$5,000 
Figures and headings taken from Agricul.ttualHandbook oj Charts 1968, no. 359, page 5. 
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viable as agriculture became even more capital intensive in the 20th 
centwy.2 
The national government became involved with the disposal of land in 
1784 when Virginia gave title to most of its land north of the Ohio River to 
the national government. By 1898, through various transactions and 
acquisitions. the United States contained 1.4 mUlion acres of land. 72 per 
cent of which was part of the public domain. Most of the public domain 
land which passed into private hands went into agricultural production. In 
disposing of this land, Congress dealt with four major questions: 1) the use 
of the revenue generated from land sales: 2) how to survey land; 3) the 
political status of the areas sold from the public domain; and 4) what the 
minimum price should be and the minimum size of the land lot an 
individual had to buy at auction. After initial arguments. consensus for 
decisions 1,.2 and 3 came quickly. Congress returned to the subject of land 
prices and the minimum lot size. Debate began in 1784 over the price and 
minimum lot size. really a component of the price question. and continued 
throughout the 19th century.3 
This debate was in part philosophical and in part practical. On one side 
were the "conservatives" or Hamiltonians who wanted to sell large tracts of 
land for a high price. This suited their belief that the United States should 
be governed by the rich. One symbol of wealth was the ownership of land. 
The conservatives supported the sale of large tracts of public domain land to 
maintain this class of wealthy landowners. On the other side the liberals or 
Jeffersonians wanted to sell smaller tracts of land at a low price or even give 
land away. They envisioned the United States as a country of small scale 
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landholders operating their own farms. The liberals worked to reduce the 
minimum price of land per acre and the minimum number of acres one had 
to buy from the public domain. Four land laws-- the Land Ordinance of 
1785. the Act of 1820. the Preemption Act of 1841, and the Homestead Act 
of 1862-- are demonstrative of the struggle between these two sides.4 
The Ordinance of 1 785 created the basic survey and sale system for the 
public domain, all of which was west of the Appalachian ridge, thus 
encouraging the development of agriculture on the frontier. Land was sold 
at auction originally in lots of 640 acres for a minimum bid of $1.00 per 
acre payable in cash upon purchase. Few settlers could afford to buy such a 
large amount of land. As a result. land speculation was a common 
occurrence as investors bought land wholesale from the government and 
retailed it in smaller units to actual farmers. Several adjustments to this 
law occurred. In 1820 the liberals were victorious in passing a major 
overhaul of the existing land law. The Act of 1820 reduced the minimal 
amount of land purchased at auction to 160 acres at a cost of$I.25 per 
acre. The success of these changes in disposing of the public domain can be 
seen in the increase of land sales. Between 1800 and 1819 only 16 million 
acres were sold. between 1820 and 1840. 75 million acres passed into private 
hands.5 
Despite laws forbidding settlement in advance of the survey crews and 
necessary treaty negotiations with Native Americans. squatters pushed 
ahead of survey parties to establish homes and clear areas for cultivation. 
These squatters were not protected by any land laws. As their numbers 
grew, Congress had to deal with them by passing a series of temporary "pre-
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emption" laws between 1799 and 1841. The general Pre-emption Act of 
1841, gave squatters anywhere the right to file a claim for public domain 
land on which they had settled with the option of purchasing the land at 
the minimum price without competition before the auction. During these 
years the government continued to grant land to states and entrepreneurs 
in order to encourage the development of a transportation infrastructure, 
drain swamps and reward military service.6 
In 1862, the landmark Homestead Act gave every adult citizen or 
individual who was to become a citizen, and the head of a household a one 
time opportunity to claim up to 160 acres of available public domain land. 
At the end of five years, if the settler proved that ~e or she had built a 
house and developed the land, the government gave the settler a deed. The 
popularity of the Homestead Act can be seen in the large number of claims 
filed within the first five years after its passage. Settlers filed 82,610 claims 
for 13.2 million acres of public domain land. Later laws made other land 
available to settlers for a variety of purposes, with the net result that 787.4 
million acres of the public domain had been sold or given away by 1933. 
This distribution of land had stimulated the development of agriculture. 7 
By the latter 19th centwy the federal government had not only made the 
land base available but began to support ways to increase the yield from 
that base. The purposeful education of farmers began in the settings of 
agricultural societies found early in the nation's history. These societies 
helped to organize and disseminate infonnation on new agricultural 
technology and better farming methods. The passage of the Morrill Act of 
1862, at the same time as the Homestead Act, gave federal support to 
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educating fanners. The Morrill Act established public colleges "to teach 
such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic 
arts. " 1\venty five years later the Hatch Act extended federal fmancial 
support to agricultural experiment stations whose mission was to "aid in 
acquiring and diffusing among the people . . . useful and practical 
information on subjects connected with agriculture." The fmal piece of the 
education policy was put into place in 1914 with the passage of the Smith-
Lever Act establishing the cooperative extension service whose charge was to 
offer practical demonstrations of new methods in agriculture and home 
economics.8 
Through the land-grant institutions, the agricultural experiment 
stations, and the extension service, the federal government encouraged the 
development of new agricultural technology. The land-grant colleges 
brought young farmers into the classroom to study farm management, 
agricultural engineering, field crop science, and animal husbandry through 
regular courses, short-courses, and winter agricultural studies programs. 
The experiment stations held field days to demonstrate the latest technology 
and cropping methods. Over the years land-grant institutions and 
experiment stations produced a large volume of information, such as crop 
reports, market outlooks, and research results which helped to increase the 
knowledge of fanners. 
The results of this land development and educational/research effort can 
be seen in the productivity gains in the first half of the 20th century. In 
1900 one farmer fed almost 7 people; by the end of the Korean War in 1953, 
one farmer could feed 18 people. As capital intensive inputs such ashybrid 
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seed, fertilizer and equipment replaced labor and land inputs, the 
percentage of the total United States population who listed farm laborer as 
their occupation dropped from 17 per cent in 1900 to 5 per cent in 1953. 
Even with this decline in the number of farm laborers, fann owners were 
able to continue producing more grain and livestock. The adoption of new 
technology kept increasing the productivity of farmers and the land. In 
1900, 94,852,000 acres of com were planted with a total harvest of 
2,661,978,000 bushels. In 1953, farmers planted 80,459,000 acres to corn, a 
decline of over 14 million acres, and still harvested 3,209,896,000 bushels, 
an increase of over half a billion bushels. One of major reasons for the 
increase in yields was the adoption of hybrid com seed. In 1933, .1 
percent or 143,000 of all acres planted used hybrid corn seed. By 1953, 86.6 
percent or 70,457,000 of all acres planted used hybrid seed corn. The 
development of the gasoline powered tractor was the greatest of all the 
agricultural technology breakthoughs as it pennitted fanners to grow more 
grain and less hay and oats and to give up pastures land used for horses 
and mules. Tractors and associated cultivating, planting, and harvesting 
equipment allowed individual fanners to farm more land and to be more 
efficient in use of that land. In the years from 191 ° to 1933 and from 1933 
to 1953 the number of tractors on farms rose dramatically. In 1910 there 
were only 1,000 tractors, by 1933 there were 1,019,000 tractors, and by 1953 
the number had quadrupled to 4,400,000. The number of corn pickers rose 
also but not as dramatically as in the first period. In 1920, farmers owned 
2,882 com pickers, by 1930 fanners owned 50,000 com pickers, and by 1953 
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the number had risen to 630,000. The usage of fertilizer more than 
quadrupled from 5,110,000 tons in 1933 to 22,631,000 tons in 1953.9 
While the adoption of technology, use of improved seeds, and application 
of fertilizer increased the productivity of individual farmers, they also 
increased fixed production costs. The Department of Agriculture noted in 
1954 that fann production expenses increased. almost four times from $6 
billion in 1939 to $23 billion in 1952. Among the reasons for this rise was 
the increased dependence of fanners on industrial agricultural products. 
The option of purchasing agricultural technology presented farmers with a 
dllemma--to not buy the technology·meant falling behind competively, but 
to buy the technology meant either paying cash or finding credit at a 
reasonable rate of interest. Farmers who did buy hoped that the short-term 
financial strain would be justified by the long-term increase iD the 
commodities sent to market. Fanners thought that having more to sell 
would translate into greater income. As more fanners invested in 
production-increasing technology, surpluses flooded the market causing 
prices to fall, and the expected increase ill fann income never came. There 
developed a growing disparity between farmers net income and industrial 
workers net income. In 1910, net fann income per person was $139, at the 
same time industrial workers income per person was $482.00. By 1933 
persons deriving their living from fanning made on average $94.00 while the 
average among those individuals who were working in industry was $417. 
Fanners, farm organizations, and the federal government tried to identify 
solutions to the growing disparity between prices received for commodities 
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and prices paid for supplies and production inputs as well as the perceived 
low net fann income. IO 
From 1923 to 1929. Congress had debated the McNary-Haugen bill. The 
bill. based on the Peek Plan was introduced by two congressmen. Charles L. 
McNary, Senator from Oregon, and GUbert N. Haugen, Representative from 
Iowa. The bill called for an increase in exports to raise fann commodity 
prices so fanners would have increased purchasing power. This idea of 
having a given unit of agricultural product, e.g. a bushel of wheat. have the 
purchasing power it did in the years on average from 1909-1914 came to be 
called parity. Parity establishes a ratio between the current buying power of 
a bushel of grain or an animal compared ~o what that bushel of grain or 
animal could have bought during a period when the purchasing power was 
favorable. For agriculture those favorable years fell between August 1909 to 
July 1914. The McNary-Haugen bill discussion influenced the Agriculture 
Adjustment Acts of 1933 and 1938. The bill was twice vetoed by President 
Coolidge. who believed farmers should not rely on the government for 
outright price support. Instead Coolidge signed the Cooperative Marketing 
Act in 1926. His successor, President Herbert Hoover agreed with Coolidge. 
refusing to advocate giving farmers direct fmancial support. Hoover. 
however, did agreed to the 1929 Agricultural Marketing Act. I I 
The Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926 and the Agricultural Marketing 
Act of 1929 attempted to raise the price received by fanners for the 
commodities they sold through cooperative marketing ploys. The 
Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926 created the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics and charged it with collecting and disseminating marketing 
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information to "associations of producers of agricultural products and 
federations" who were involved with the "cooperative marketing" of 
commodities. It was hoped by President Coolidge that the associations 
would be able to help establish fair market prices. The Agricultural 
Marketing Act of 1929 established a Federal Farm Board which lent 
assistance in educating farmers on the methods of cooperative marketing. 
The Farm Board was to conduct studies on a wide variety of topics: land 
utilization, new product development for existing surplus commodities, new 
domestic and foreign markets. The act also provided for the establishing of 
emergency "stabilization corporations" for commodities which needed 
assistance in controlling the flow of products to market. The corporation 
could buy, store, and sell commodities in surplus. 12 
These attempts to regulate the flow of products to market and assist 
agricultural producers in·setting their own prices did not address the root 
cause of the problem--productivity increasing faster than demand. With the 
onset of the Great Depression a new attitude concerning the role of the 
government in planning and controlling the economic life of the nation 
resulted in the passage of sweeping social and economic legislation. The 
government's programs towards agriculture changed from suggesting how 
agriculture could help itself to voluntary programs of production control 
with cash incentives and rewards to farmers who partiCipated. This policy 
was enunciated in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA 1), the Soil 
Conservation and Domestic Allotment of 1936 (SCDAA of 1936), and the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA 2). These three laws established 
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the foundation for what Heady would derme as the "traditional fann 
program" .13 
The first Agricultural Adjustment Act and the Soil ConseIVation and 
Domestic Allotment Act established benefit payments and soil conservation 
programs as approved methods to "reestablish prices to farmers at a level 
that will give agricultural commodities a purchasing power with respect to 
articles that fanners buy. . ." This established a "parity index", a ratio 
between current buying power of a bushel of grain or an animal compared to 
what that bushel or animal could have bought during a more favorable 
period time. Farm organizations, farmers and CongreSSional allies believed 
that fanners should receive payments to bring current purchasing power in 
line with that of 1909-1914. Thus parity was an index of agriculture's 
"economic health". 14 
The AAA of 1933 provided for cash benefits to fanners, tenants, and 
sharecroppers who agreed to store a portion of their crop under seal. In 
return for storing their crop the Secretary of Agriculture made direct benefit 
payments "in such amounts as the Secretary deems fair and reasonable . . 
.ft to the complying fanner. The act also used the idea of marketing 
agreements with "processors, producers, associations of producers and 
others engaged in handling any agricultural commodity or product ... tt to 
control the amount of commodities produced and sent to market. 
Individuals or associations signing marketing agreements were eligible for 
loans through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. To be eligible for 
the loans the producer had to agree to reduce production by 30 percent. To 
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pay for the benefits, the AAA of 1933 introduced a processing tax on initial 
handlers of those commodities. I5 
In 1936, because of the processing tax, the Supreme Court, ruled the 
AAA unconstitutional. As a temporary relief measure, Congress passed the 
Soll Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. This act was 
similar to the AAA in paying fanners directly to take land out of production. 
The act rationalized the payments for soll conservation as a way to 
"provide for the protection of land resources against soll erosion." States 
were to submit plans to the Secretary of Agriculture for approval and for 
distribution of funds to pay fanners who participated in the program. 
Section 2 of the law also retained the idea of "reestablishing fanners' 
purchasing power ... " without specifying how, except to say the Secretary 
was to determine the level of "normal production" needed to met the 
domestic market demands. 16 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA-2) established a series of 
marketing quotas and parity scales to reduce the number of acres planted, 
to regulate the amount of commodities going to market, and to increase the 
buying power of fanners. The Department of Agriculture, using various 
formulas, mOnitored the domestic needs for commodities and the level of 
production by fanners. When a commodity was produced in excess of 
domestic needs, the Department could call for a marketing quota 
referendum. If two-thirds of the producers of that commodity approved, 
then individual acreage allotments were assigned. Allotments were based on 
previous acreage allotments, land base, labor, equipment, crop rotation 
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practices, etc. A complying fanner had to plant more than fifteen acres to 
receive an allotment. 17 
The 1938 Act also established price supports for the basic commodities: 
com, cotton, whole milk, tobacco, chicken eggs, farm chickens, hogs, beef 
cattle, lambs and wheat. The Secretary of Agriculture, working through the 
Commodity Credit Corporation, supported prices by use of loans, purchases, 
and production control payments. The fanners who participated had to 
agree to enroll in at least one of the following programs-- acreage 
allotments, production goals, marketing quotas, and/or soil conservation 
practices-- to be eligible for the government assistance. Fanners who 
decided not to participate could also receive price supports but at much 
lower levels. The level of price support was figured on a parity index. IS 
If the Secretary of Agriculture decided to use cash incentives to limit the 
production of a commodity. the amount received by the farmer was based on 
the estimated average price for the commodity. Price supports could not be 
in effect for the same period of time a defeated marketing quota would have 
been in effect. If storage loans were available, the complying farmer would 
receive the loan through the Commodity Credit Corporation. If the fanner 
was unable to sell his agricultural commodities at the price support level or 
higher, the Commodity Credit Corporation acquired the surplus commodity 
and paid to store it or use it in a number of ways. The Secretary of 
Agriculture calculated the amount of each commodity for domestic needs. 
For farmers AAA-l , SCDAA and AAA-2 brought benefits but also 
drawbacks that few realized at the time. The government program of the 
1930s gave farmers money directly as well as indirectly through support 
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commodity prices. The programs also encouraged fann consolidation and 
expansion because larger fanns received larger allotments and bigger 
payments. These farmers used the payments to buy more agricultural 
technology thus reducing the number of fann laborers needed. The 
efficiency of the farmer continued to increase which meant fewer farmers 
were needed and fann consolidation continued as some farmers were forced 
to leave. 
World War II caused a raise in demand for agricultural commodities and 
prices increased rapidly. By 1944, American wartime agricultural 
production had reached a new high. For example, in 1944, 3.1 billion 
bushels of corn were harvested, the most com ever picked for one year. 
Wheat farmers harvested 1.2 billion bushels, another all time harvest high. 
To encourage farmers to continue producing at record levels, the government 
passed several acts which maintained payments at a high level of the parity 
index. In 1941, the Steagall Amendment set price support at 85 percent of 
parity for com, wheat, cotton, rice, and tobacco. For the first time a level of 
parity was guaranteed. The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 raised the 
support level for the above commodities to 90 percent of parity. The 90 
percent of parity was to remain in effect for two years following the end of 
the war. This increase in government support for agriculture prices help to 
raise the 1945 average gross farm income to $4,033, higher than it had 
been in the years 1929 to 1944. These two laws indicated a shift in 
government programs from restricting crop production to encouraging it. 19 
World War II revived the stalled agricultural economy. By the end of the 
war, 5 million people had left the agricultural sector for work in industry. 
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By 1950 the U.S. had 714,637 fewer fanns than in 1940 and of the farmers 
left, only 12 percent earned $10,000 or more per year from the sale of their 
products. The largest group, 56 percent, earned only $2,500 or less from the 
sale of agricultural products. At the same time the cost of the fann program 
had grown and by 1957 the government annually handed out 
$1,015,842,000 in support payments which many farmers used to buy 
equipment to increase their production. Table 2.3 shows the growth in the 
total government payments to agriculture from 1933 to 1970. The 
government's payments increased seven times between 1933 and 1945. In 
the 12 years between 1940 and 1952, output per man hour had almost 
. . 
doubled. The increase in production was acceptable during the second 
World War, as much of Europe was not able to produce enough to feed 
itself. However, after the war, American farmers had a difficult time 
readjusting to demands of the domestic and foreign markets.2o 
World War II ended in August of 1945, but the guaranteed high 
agricultural price supports carried on for two more years. In 1947 the 
debate, which would continue for twenty years, took shape as Congress 
prepared to write new agriculturallegislatlon. The basic issue was whether 
to continue high fixed price supports, like the Emergency Price Control Act, 
or to give price supports a degree of flexibility. Flexible supports could be 
linked with changes in consumer demand. A fixed level of support would 
guarantee fanners a specific price. 
Depending on the policy selected. price support prog~s could restrain 
the amount a farmer could sell or reduce the amount of land a fanner could 
plant. Another possibility was for the Department of Agriculture and 
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Table 2.3 Total Annual Government Payments 1933- 1970 
Year Total 
Million Dollars(a) 
1933 131 
1940 723 
1945 742 
1950 283 
1955 229 
1960 702 
1965 2.463 
1970 3.717 
Ca) This total includes payments for ConselVation. Soil Bank. Sugar Act. Wool. Feed Grain. 
Wheat. Cotton, Rental and Benefits, Price Adjustment and Parity, Wartime Production 
Subsidy, Cropland Adjustment, and Miscellaneous programs such as the Milk Indemnity 
program. 
Figures and headings taken from Table 21H of the July 1974 Fann Income Situation. FIS 
224. 
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Congress to create a completely different policy and program. In the late 
1940s and throughout the 1950s, Democrats usually supported high flXed 
price supports similar to the farm program already in place, while 
Republicans wanted to reduce price support levels and minimize the role of 
the government in farm affairs. Central to the debate was the policy of the 
1930s reflected in the programs of restrained production versus the policy 
of "organized, sustained, and realistic abundance" of agricultural 
production proposed by the Department of Agriculture in 1947.21 
1948 was a year of transition for agricultural programs. Congress, the 
Department of Agriculture, fann organizations and others still remembered 
the tumultuous years following World War I, when agricultural prices fell by 
50 percent in a year. The Emergency Price Control Act guarantee, which 
was price support at 90 percent of parity until 1948, was one step taken to 
prevent a repeat of the price drops experienced from 1919 to 1921. The 
Agri~ultural Act of 1948 was a precarious compromise between high flXed 
price supports and flexible price supports. High price supports were to 
continue for one year and then the flexible price supports were to take 
effect. The election ofTnunan, a Democrat, as president in 1948, bought a 
return to the debate as the Secretary of Agriculture proposed a new 
agricultural program.22 
In 1949, Secretary of Agriculture Charles F. Brannan who supported high 
parity levels, proposed to set price supports at 90 to 100 percent of parity, 
but there was a catch. Brannan suggested a cap on support payments. A 
fanner would be eligible to received support payments on only the fIrst 
$25,700 of commodities sold. He hoped that such a cap would even out the 
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unequal distribution of government support among small scale fanners who 
did not benefit monetarily from support payments. Table 2.4 shows the 
distribution of government payments.based on sales classes. The table does 
show an unevenness in distribution of payments. His plan also called for 
price supports for perishables, such as eggs and fruit, but without 
production controls. Producers of these commodities could raise and sell all 
the produce they wanted to and the government would pay the difference 
between the sale price and the parity level price to the farmer. The 
American Fann Bureau approved of the high parity levels but was opposed 
to the dollar limit placed on the commodities covered. Instead of adopting 
Brannan's Plan, Qongress passed the AAA of 1949.23 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1949 established flexible price 
supports which supposedly would encourage farmers to produce less by tying 
the level of price support to the level of production. If too much of one 
commodity was produced creating a surplus, the supports received by 
fanners were reduced. If the fanners reduced their production to be more in 
line with the needs of the domestic and foreign market, support would be 
increased. Organizations representing small farmers, such as the Farmers 
Union opposed flexible price supports while the American Farm Bureau, 
representing larger established fanners, approved of the plan. 
With the election of Republican Eisenhower as President in 1952 the focus 
of agricultural policy changed from guaranteed parity levels to flexible price 
supports and limited government interference in agriculture. President 
Eisenhower and his Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson frrmly 
believed in flexible price supports and reduced government involvement in 
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Table 2.4 Direct Government Payments by Sales Classes,1960-1970 
Year $100.000 $40.000 
and to 
over $99,999 
Farms with Sales 
$20.000 $10.000 
to to 
$39,999 $19.999 
$5.000 
to 
$9.999 
$2.500 
and 
less 
Total Government Payments in Millions of Dollars 
1960 30 77 III 159 144 
1965 147 310 487 627 396 
1970 510 721 880 679 398 
Averages per Farm. Dollars 
1960 1,304 856 489 320 218 
1965 4,083 2.480 1.739 1.351 780 
1970 9,273 4,051 2,566 1,741 1.003 
Percentage of Distribution 
1960 4.3 11.0 15.8 22.6 20.5 
1965 6.0 12.6 19.8 25.4 16.1 
1970 13.7 19.4 23.7 18.2 10.7 
181 
488 
529 
94 
322 
414 
25.7 
"20.1 
14.3 
Figures and headings taken from 6D in the July 1974 Issue ofFann Income Situation. FIS 
224. 
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agriculture. In his first state of the Union address, Eisenhower endorsed 
"economic stability and full parity of income . . . n for farmers but with less 
government involvement, thus pennitting farmers to shift with the changing 
consumer demands. Eisenhower announced the creation of a special 
"advisory commission" to study agricultural problems and to develop new 
solutions. Secretary of Agriculture, Benson put forth his plan, which 
reflected Eisenhower's attitude, for reducing government involvement in 
agriculture.24 
Benson characterized his agricultural program as freedom for fanners to 
farm. The Benson Plan had five pOints. The plan recognized the drastic 
changes in agriculture because of new technology and the resulting increase. 
in output per man-hour. Benson called for the elimination of support 
prices based on the 1910-1914 period in favor of support prices based 
according to recent prices paid by consumers. He hoped this would 
encourage farmers to adjust production in accordance with ~emand. 
Benson also argued that the old "price supports tend to prevent a balance 
between production and demand and result in continuing surpluses and 
subsidies." Benson wanted to expand the conservation reserve program by 8 
to 12 million acres which would be available for cropping if the world 
situation called for renewed intensive farming. This plan called for the 
disposal of surplus food through humanitarian programs. Benson's Plan 
wanted to assist the small farmer by finding alternative income sources. 
Benson did include "disaster prevention" for times when economic and 
weather-related crisises affected agriculture. Before coming to the 
government for assistance, he believed fanners should try methods of self 
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help, such as realigning production to be more in keeping with consumer 
demand. Benson's program with its reduction in support prices caused 
many fanners to believe that he did not understand their plight.25 
Many farmers, farm lobbyists and their political allies did not 
understand Benson's actions and intentions. In a poll taken by the 
Wallaces Farmer in January 1954, only 18 percent of the fanners polled 
believed Benson was doing a good job as Secretary of Agriculture. One 
farmer noted, ''The way I see it, Benson is selling the fanner down the river." 
Congress agreed with the farmers and Benson's plan was soundly rejected. 
As a result Congress, the Administration and farm organizations found 
themselves at an impass over fann policy regarding price supports.26 
As the schism between the Congress, the Administration and fann 
organizations developed, a new policy or program for agriculture did not 
emerge in the 1950s. Politicians did not want to enact new legislation 
which would upset the farmers. Farm organizations were not united behind 
one single policy/program, so the "farm bloc" did not have the political 
power to force legislation through Congress. 
With Congress and the administration at odds, agricultural programs 
were written year to year. Eisenhower proposed and Congress passed the 
Soil Bank Act of 1956 as an attempt to control production but without the 
government setting production quotas or marketing allotments. The 
program was voluntary and a farmer could put his land into an "acreage 
reserve" for at least three years with the maximum being ten years. The 
farmer would receive compensation for setting land aside.27 
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By the 1960s. agricultural interests were still debating the level of price 
supports. Congress and the Department of Agriculture had to decide 
whether to follow flexible price supports or high fixed levels of support. 
With the election of Kennedy. a Democrat as president, the focus of 
agricultural policy and programs came back to increased government 
involvement and a return to programs of price support and production 
contro1. The Kennedy administration believed the problem was the 
uncontrolled surplus. Its agricultural program called for "supply 
management" which used "marketing quotas. land retirement" and greater 
government involvement in farm operating decisions to try and raise farm 
income. ~ennedyalso wanted the power to write agricultural legislation 
transferred from Congress to the executive branch. This provision effectively 
killed the bill in committee. Kennedy had to rely on year to year 
agricultural programs. It was not until after the assassination of Kennedy 
and Lyndon Johnson took office that agriculture got its fIrst long-term 
policy and program since World War II. The Food and Agriculture Act of 
1965 was a compromise between continuing commodity support programs 
and supply contro1.28 
Alternatives to the traditional farm program offered by critics ranged 
from returning the farmer to a free market standard to returning agriculture 
to small diversified family farms reminiscent of the 19th centuty. The major 
agricultural issue was no longer just price support levels but rmding a 
solution to the problem of overwhelming surpluses caused by highly 
productive fanners. Wendell Beny in The Unsettling of America. called for a 
return to sman family farms and the removal of the government from 
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agriculture. He wanted to break up large farms so that everyone could have 
a farm. In The Successful Farmer. the editor of the column 'Friend to 
Friend' noted "we have improved our farming methods to the point where 
we can produce a surplus of almost anything at anytime except in war. 
Prospects of increasing population catching up to productivity ... are poor. 
The answer-- fewer farmers. It The article listed several alternative 
programs. and called for the adoption of Benson's suggestion of removing 
marginal farmers from farming and retraining them or improving their 
education so that they could move into the industrial sector. Edward 
Higbee in Farms and Farmers in an Urban Age examined the state of the 
farm in an era of intensive capital. He noted that government assistance 
was going to the larger fanners and the farmers on ~e other end of the 
scale. who could benefit from aid. received very little. Table 2.4 illustrates 
Higbee's claim. In 1960. for example. farms with sales of $100,000 and over 
received average payments of $1.304 while farms with sales of $2.500 and 
less received average payments of $94.29 
Earl O. Heady. agricultural production economist at Iowa State 
University. believed the government's efforts in agricultural research and 
development were in conflict with the price support programs. He also 
asserted that the price support programs did not have an impact on the 
problem of low net income. Heady. a critic of the federal government's farm 
policIes and programs that grew out of the 1930s New Deal centered much 
of his research during the 1950s and 1960s on the development of his own 
alternative program called the Positive Sum Concept. Heady's alternative 
proposed programs for both fanners and non-farmers. 
27 
Endnotes 
1 The census definition of a "fann operator" is used as the basis for discussion for the 
thesis. The Census Bureau defines a "fann operator" as an individual "who operates a fann, 
either by doing the work himself or directly supervising the work." The bureau also classified 
fanns by economic classes until 1974 when it changed to a classification based on value-of-
products-sold. For the thesis, the old classification based on economic classes is used. The 
classes are $100,000 and over; $40,000 to $99,999; $20,000 to $39.999; $10,000 to $19,999; 
and $5.000 to $9.000 and $2.500 and less. Fanus having sales of more than $2.500 are 
conSider commercial fanners. U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census, 1974 
Census of Agriculture vol. 2 pt.1(Washington. D.C .. :GPO, May. 1978).17. U.S. Department of 
Commerce Bureau of the Census, 1964 Census of Agriculture vol. 2 pt. 1 (Washington. 
D.C .. :GPO, May, 1968),17. 
2 Willard W. Cochrane. The Development oj American Agriculttue : An Historical Analysis, 3rd 
ed. (Minneapolis. MN.: University of Minnesota Press, 1984),38. Luther G. Tweeten, 
Foundations oJFannPolicy, 2nd rev. ed. (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 
97, 101. 
3 Willard W. Cochrane. The Development oj American Agriculttue : An Historical Analysis, 3rd 
ed. (Minneapolis, MN.: University of Minnesota Press, 1984),41. 
4 Willard W. Cochrane, The Development oj American Agriculttue : An Historical Analysis, 3rd 
ed. (Minneapolis, MN.: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).41.42. Ross B. Talbot and Don 
F. Hadwiger, The Policy Process in American Agriculttue (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing 
Company. 1968), 23-25. Land Ordinance of 1785 see 1 Stat 464, May 18, 1796 for the text 
of the law. Land Act of 1820, see 3 Stat 566. April 24, 1820. Preemption Act of 1841. see 5 
Stat 453, September 4. 1841 for the text of the law. Homestead Act of 1862. see 12 Stat 
392, May 20, 1862 for the text of the law. 
5 Land Ordinance of 1785 see 1 Stat 464, May 18, 1796 for the text of the law. Willard W. 
Cochrane. The Development oj American Agriculttue: A Historical Analysis, 3rd ed. 
(Minneapolis. MN.: University of Minnesota Press. 1984), 57. 
6 Preemption Act of 1841, see 5 Stat 453, September 4, 1841 for the text of the law. 
7 Homestead Act of 1862, see 12 Stat 392, May 20, 1862 for the text of the law. Section 4 of 
the law sets out the requirements for filing and proving a claim. The figures were compiled 
by the author from a table in the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Historical Abstracts oj the United States: Colonial Times to 1970; part 1 (Washington, 
D.C.:GPO, 1976),429. For a complete discussion of land poliCies see Paul W. Gates, "An 
OveIView of American Land Policy." Agriculttual History, 5O(January 1976),213-229. 
8 Tweeten, Foundations oj Fann Policy, 121. For the text of the laws discussed in this 
paragraph see Morrill Act of 1862, 12 Stat 503, July 2, 1863; Hatcher Act of 1887, 24 Stat 
440, March 2, 1887: and the Cooperative Extension Act of 1914, 38 Stat 372, May 8, 1914. 
9 U.S. Department of Agriculture. Agriculttual Statistics 1957 (Washington, D.C .. :GPO, 
1957),35,39,531,532,592. Willard W. Cochrane, The Development of American Agriculture: A 
HistoricalAnalysis, 3rd ed. (Minneapolis. MN.: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 108.109. 
10 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fann Cost Situation FCS-17( October 1954),1. U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. Agricultural Statistics 1942 (Washington, D.C .. :GPO, 1942),663. 
28 
11 Parity was first discussed In 1922 in a pamphlet published by George N. Peek. For further 
discussion see. John D. Black's book Parity, Parity, Parity • (Cambridge. Mass.: The President 
and FeIIows of Harvard. 1942; New York: Da Capo Press, 1972) and Gilbert C. Ftte's book 
George N. Peek and the Fightfor Farm Parity. (Nonnan. OK.: University of Oklahoma Press. 
1954). For the text of these two laws see 41 Stat 802 for the Cooperative Marketing Act of 
1926 and 44 Stat 11 for the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929. 
12 Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926. 41 Stat 802 and 44 Stat 11 for the Agricultural 
Marketing Act of 1929. 
13 To read the text of these laws see 48 Stat. 31 • May 12. 1933 for the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933; SoU Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. 49 Stat. 
1150, Februruy 29, 1936 and the second AgrIcultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 215, 
Februruy 16, 1938. 
14 Tweeten, Foundations ofFannPolicy, 165, 164. 
15 AAAof 1933,48 Stat. 31. 
16 SCDA of 1935, 49 Stat. 1150. 
17 AAA of 1938, 52 Stat. 215. 
18 AAA of 1938, 52 Stat. 215. 
19 For the Steagall Amendment see 55 Stat. 498. For the Emergency Price Control Act of 
1942 amended, see 56 Stat. 765. These figures came from the government's September issue 
of the Farm Income Situation. 
20 These statistics are from the 1954 and 1957 Agricultural Statistics and the government's 
September issue of Farm Income Situation. See also WUlard W. Cochrane and Mary E. 
Ryan. American Fann Policy, 1948-1973 (Minneapolis. MN.: University of Mtnnesota Press, 
1976) for a general discussion of farm policy during this period. 
21 House Committee on AgrIculture, Hearings on Long-Range Range Agricultural Policy. 80th 
Cong., 1st sess .• 1947. 2. 
22 Willard W. Cochrane and Mary E. Ryan. American Farm Policy, 1948-1973 (Minneapolis, 
MN.: University of Mtnnesota Press. 1976), 21-71. 
23 GUbert C. Ftte, American Fanners: The New Minority, (Bloomington, IN.: Indiana 
University Press. 1981). 96. For the text of the law see 63 Stat. 1049. 
24 "President's Address Tells Congress of 'New and Positive' Approach", New York Times, 3 
February 1953, 15. 
25''Benson Outlines Long·Term Policy". New York Times. 6 February 1953, 13. See also 
Ezra Taft Benson Freedom to Fann (Garden City. NY: Doubleday and Co .• 1960). 
26 Poll in the WaUaces Farmer. 2 Januruy 1954. 17. 
27 To read the text of the law see 70 Stat 188. May 28. 1956. 
29 
28 See Willard W. Cochrane and Mruy E. Ryan. American Fann Policy. 1948-1973 
(Minneapolis. MN.: University of Minnesota Press. 1976).21-71 for a more comprehensive 
discussion. Also Gilbert C. Fite. American Farmers: The New Minority. (Bloomington. IN.: 
Indiana University Press. 1981). 
29 Wendell Beny. The Unsettling of Amerlca;: Culture andAgriculture (San Francisco: Sierra 
Club Books. 1977): Edward Higbee. Fanns and Farmers in an Urban Age (New York: The 
1\ventieth Century Fund. 1963): "Friend to Friend". SuccessfulFarming. (July 1954).8. 
30 
CHAPTER THREE: EARL O. HEADY POSITNE SUM CONCEPT 
Earl Oriel Heady was born and raised in Nebraska. He received both a 
bachelor's.and master's degree from the University of Nebraska. In 1940 he 
joined the faculty at Iowa State College. Heady had a very distinguished 
career as an agricultural economist. In 1956 he was named the fIrst 
Charles F. Curtiss Distinguish Professor in Agriculture at Iowa State 
College. During his career Heady received many honors; among them was 
his membership in the Soviet Academy of Agricultural Science; honorary 
doctor of science degrees from universities in Poland, Sweden and Hungary 
and a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. One of his lasting 
contributions to Iowa State was founding the Center for Agriculture and 
Economic Development in 1958. Heady joined with colleagues both within 
and outside the Iowa State College Agricultural Economics Department to 
fonn the Center to study the problems of agriculture and rural areas. 
Under Heady's guidance, the Center became a leader in the area of 
agricultural and rural development poliCies and programs. Now called the 
Center for Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD), its focus has 
remained the examination of agricultural poliCies and development on a 
global leve1. l 
Heady criticized what he saw as the "traditional" farm programs of the 
1950s and 1960s because they focused on overproduction of commodities 
and low net farm income as the core of agricultural problems. Heady 
believed overproduction and low net income were just symptoms of the real 
crisis of agriculture, which was the unwillingness of farmers to adjust their 
production levels to reflect their ability to increase output from a given 
31 
number of acres by applying more technology. To prove this contention he 
used linear programming models. Heady was among the early pioneers in 
adapting linear programming to agriculture economics. In fact this 
adaptation was Heady's major contribution to the field of economics. In 
1952 Heady wrote EconomicS of Agricu.l.tw-al Production and Resource Use. A 
reviewer in the Academic Annals of Political and Social &ience called the 
book a "trailblazer". The reviewer for the Journal of Farm Economics noted 
that the book published the theory of linear programming "for the first 
time". The book would gamer Heady honors· from the Iowa State University 
Press for the outstanding book of the year and from the American Farm 
Economic Association. the "Outstanding Research" award. Linear 
programming uses mathematical equations to assist people in making 
decisions concerning the amount of a resource needed to accomplish a task. 
Heady used the mathematical equations to analyze the strengths and 
wealmesses of the government's agricultural programs and to compare his 
proposed programs with the government programs. 2 
Heady thought that public policy makers needed the type of 
infonnation linear programming provided in order to make sound policy 
decisions concerning agriculture. He believed the lack of such data created 
an inherent wealmess in traditional farm policy decision making. Heady 
harped on this theme frequently in such works as Roots oj the Farm Problem 
published in 1965 which was a "popularized version" of Resource Demand 
and Structure of the Agricultural Industry. ''The results of our major study .. 
. should be useful to ... administrators faced with developing agricultural 
policies consistent with the basic forces involved and further national 
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economic development: and to the public in its concern with the causes and 
consequences of major commercial farm problems and policies." Heady tried 
to help the general public as well as public policy-makers to understand the 
complexities of the farm problem. 'The popu1ar explanation of the farm 
problem has been that large output of agricu1tural commodities has caused 
low prices. But the large output is a resu1t rather than a cause. The basic 
cause is to be found in the quantities and forms of inputs used." The 
"inputs" were the many new varieties of agricultural technology developed 
by the land-grant colleges and private companies. The adoption of the new 
technology created two problems that Heady identified as 1) "the surplus 
problem, with the tendency of output and commodity supply to progress 
faster than consumer demand for food" and 2) the capital substitution 
problem, in which changes in price relationships led to the "substitution of 
capital· for labor." Overproduction and low net income were the symptoms 
of the disease of applying new technology to agriculture.3 
What seemed wrong to Heady and others was that while the 
government, through its support of the Department of Agricu1ture, the 
extension service and the land-grant universities, and agribusiness, 
encouraged farmers to adopt the new technology which led to increased 
productivity and growing surpluses, the government also had a policy of 
trying to mitigate the results by price support programs for farmers and food 
relief programs for low income consumers. In Heady's terms, to use 
"programs of compensation" to "redress the general impairment of the farm 
economic position . . . " while supporting research and development to 
increase productivity cancelled out the intended goals for both programs. 
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The compensation programs attempted to control the flow of products to the 
marketplace or to restrict the number of acres planted in order to raise 
farmers' net income through scarcities. To Heady this did not address the 
problems but simply contradicted the federal government's research and 
development programs.4 
Heady had complained about this as early as 1960,. At the First 
Annual Fann Policy Review Conference sponsored by CARD he said, "On the 
one hand we have programs which pay fanners for the use of inputs which 
increase production. On the other hand, we give direct payments to farmers 
to lessen land and related inputs, as a means of decreasing output." The 
result was an unstated agricultural policy favoring "fewer, larger and more 
specialized fanns and enterprises, a high ration or substitution of capital 
for labor, a smaller workforce and a greater dependence on effective 
management . . ." For farmers to survive in this environment they had to 
have a solid education, avail themselves of information on new technology 
and have a sizable source of ready credit. The government's price support 
program was supposedly to preserve the family farm which many people 
assumed was the smaller scale fann. Yet in reality the program aided the 
commercial farmers, only 30 percent of the farmers as defined by the Census 
in 1964. The lower income sectors of agriculture did not benefit. These 
small scale fanners were caught in a cycle of poverty; they did not have 
enough money or available credit to expand their farms, nor did they have 
at their disposal the skills necessary to get a good job off the farm. Heady 
contended the time was right for identifying and implementing new poliCies 
and programs. 5 
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These changes would not be easy to institute. Conflict among the 
different agricultural interest groups "made it easier to patch up old 
legislation and go ahead, than to bring an entirely new formulation and 
orientation into being." Heady believed the agricultural interest groups 
should form a partnership with consumers to identify ways to strengthen 
ties between the two sectors. Heady believed without such a partnership 
the diminishing political power of agriculture over its own policy and 
program would force agriculture to face either a free market or strict 
control.s 
Heady's version of the future agriculture program was discussed in the 
proceedings of the first annual Farm Policy Review Conference in 1960. 
The "purpose [of the conference he said] was to provide a forum wherein the 
goals and efficient means for farm policy might be discussed in objective 
fashion by persons and groups highly responsible in policy formulation." 
Accordingly, individuals from land grant colleges, the Department of 
Agriculture, Congress, agricultural interest groups and others were invited 
to participate. This first conference identified four goals that Heady believed 
should be included in future fann policy: 1) controlling of overproduction, 
2) decreasing the size of the commodity reserve and the cost of reserve 
storage, 3) realigning farm policy to be more consistent with U.S. foreign aid 
policy, and 4) improving education and training opportunities for farm 
youth to provide them with alternatives in off-the-farm opportunities.7 
Heady called his alternative agricultural program the Positive Sum 
Concept. Heady dermed the Positive Sum Concept as ". . . providing 
conditions or supplementing income so that some people will not be made 
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'worse off' in income or welfare as other persons gain." Thus Heady's 
alternative tried to strike a balance between the commercial farmers who 
suffered under the traditional programs production restraints and the small 
scale fanner who did not have the money to buy technology to remain 
competitive. He also proposed ways to bring relief to the rural communities 
which were suffering from eroding tax bases as their surrounding farm 
populations began to decline and the needs for public services increased. 
In a paper presented in 1968 at the World Congress for Rural Sociology, 
Heady called for sociologists, political scientists, economists, and educators 
to work together in developing a policy that would benefit everyone in the 
rural community. This total package was Heady's Positive Sum concept. 
His proposed rural programs would address the long-tenn symptoms of over-
production and a large surplus reseIVe of agricultural commodities through 
pennanent removal of land from cultivation. Those fanners who participated 
in the program would be paid to leave farming, and would be assisted in 
retraining and relocating for employment outside agriculture. Depopulated 
rural communities would receive federal aid to bolster the eroding tax bases 
to maintain basic seIVices such as hospitals, quality schools, and public 
utilities.8 
In a series of Center for Agricultural Economic Development (CAED) 
Reports beginning in 1963 and ending in 1969, Heady published the results 
of his linear programming analysis of traditional agricultural programs and 
his Positive Sum Concept. The object of each report was "to estimate the 
effect of several program alternatives on net fann income, government costs 
of supply reduction, consumer outlays for food and total public costs for 
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food and agriculture." An article in this series published in 1965 in the 
report of the fifth annual Farm Policy Review Conference typified Heady's 
work. The emphasis for the conference was the "perfonnance of current 
fann policies" with the attendees proposing ways "which would allow farm 
policies to be better meshed with the nation's broader social and economic 
goals."g 
The main text of the conference paper was a study in which Heady 
demonstrated the impact of shifting crops from traditional regions of 
production to new regions where the crops could be grown most efficiently. 
He noted the production of some crops occurred in all sections of the nation 
without regard to cost of transportation and various measures of efficiency. 
Through the use of linear programming. Heady identified four crops. com. 
soybeans, cotton, and wheat, that would make-up "central producing 
region[s]" which would bring maximum efficiency to these four crops at a 
lower production cost. The linear program model would first estimate how 
much land would be needed to meet domestic and export needs. The 
program model would determine the areas· of the country where each crop 
would be produced most effiCiently. Farmers in these regions would begin to 
specialize in that region's deSignated crop. limiting the production of other 
crops. The idea assumed the government would purchase land declared 
marginal based on soU type. effiCiency of crop production. projected demand. 
projected surplus. and impact of technology on production. Heady assumed 
that fanners in regions losing crop acres would voluntarily sell their land to 
the government at a price per acre comparable to the average price of land in 
their particular region. prorated over ten years. At the end of the ten year 
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purchase period the government would own the marginal land. Land thus 
released from productlon could be redirected to "grazing, forestry and 
recreation." A large amount of retired land would be in the South and in 
the Great Plains. For communities in these areas Heady suggested income 
tax averaging during the period the program was in operation in order to 
even out the effects of the changes, extended state and federal assistance for 
schools, public subsidies for retraining and relocation, and a lower age for 
starting Social Security benefits. He also suggested that some rural areas 
might be appropriate regions for industry.IO 
In the final report of the series, CAED Report #34, published in 1969, 
Heady and two colleagues set out in expliCit terms the cost of traditional 
and alternative agricultural program variations: The study encompassed 
three land program alternatives: a "government land use program with 
unrestricted location of-unused cropland," a "government land use program 
with restricted location of unused cropland," and continuation of the 
traditional price support and loan program. When Heady spoke of a 
restricted program versus an unrestricted program, he meant the amount of 
land in a region which could be purchased, or rented outright or for which 
production rights could be bought. A restricted whole-farm land retirement 
government program could buy 50 percent of the farms in a region. For 
example if this program were in place, the government could go into the 
South. select marginal fanns and purchase or rent, or buy the production 
rights to 50 percent of these farms. The unrestricted land retirement 
program did not limit the government to a percentage of farms from which it 
could purchase or rent the land or production rights in a geographical 
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region. To continue the above example. in an unrestricted program. the 
government could rent or buy production rights to all the marginal farms 
identified in the South. In the case of the unrestricted program. Heady 
expected the government to deal in whole farms rather than parts of farms. 
All programs analyzed operated on a voluntary basis. Fanners would receive 
payments over a ten year period. The amount of the payment would 
increase or decrease to reflect inflation and interest rates. ll 
Heady's group projected a core amount of acres that could be retired 
under a restricted program versus an unrestricted program. Heady 
estimated under an unrestricted program 57 million acres could be taken 
out of production from cultivation of major crops. while 55 million acres of 
major crop land could be retired under a restricted program. Most of the 
land retired whether under an unrestricted program or a restricted program 
would be concentrated in regions such as the South and the Great Plains. 
Table 3.1 shows the amount of land available for each of the programs. It 
also shows the cost of each program. For example if the unrestricted 
purchase program was in place. the annual cost would be $1.9 billion 
annually, compared to the current program annual cost of $3.4 billion 
annually. Heady's program would save $1.5 billion annually. Table 3.1 
shows the annual cost of each alternative program and the current 
program. 12 
The unrestricted land programs. Heady noted. were similar to the Soil 
Bank Act of 1956 because both took land completely out of cultivation. If 
more fanners had participated in the Soil Bank. the similarities between 
the two would have been even greater. according to Heady and his 
39 
colleagues. The son Bank assisted "farmers to divert a portion of their 
cropland from the production of excessive supplies of agricultural 
commodities. n Land set aside could not be harvested or grazed under 
nonnal conditions. However, under drought conditions, a state governor 
could waive this restriction and allow grazing to occur. The difference 
between the 1956 son Bank Act, other federal acts, and ~eady's 
unrestricted land program was the duration the land was withheld from 
production. The SoU Bank land was out of production temporarily; at the 
end of the program the fanner could return the land to production. The 
unrestricted land programs took land out of production pennanently. At 
the end of the ten years the government would own the land or the . 
production rights to the land and payments to farmers would cease. 13 
When Heady calculated the unrestricted cropland model, he found 
that another 45 million acres could be freed from production of minor crops, 
pasture and grass in addition to the core reduction of 57 million acres. 
Thus 102.6 million acres could be available for a governmental land 
purchase program. Fanns would be purchased at the average price of land 
in that region. The estimated ten year cost, if the price of land remained 
constant, would be $19 blllion. The core amount of land retired under an 
unrestricted rental or purchase of production rights, could be supplemented 
by an additional 16.1 million acres for a total of 73 million acres. The cost 
of this program would be· less than the traditional farm programs ~d the 
restricted land purchase program, because regions of lower quality land 
could be targeted for renting or the purchase of production rights. Rent or 
the purchase of production rights would be $16.10 per acre, for a total 
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Table 3.1 Land Totals and Government Cost Projections for 1975 
Core Acres Additional Total Rent Annual 
Acres Available Acres Payment Prog 
(minor crops. Dollar Cost 
pasture) Per Acre billion 
Thousand Acres 
Unrestricted· 
Program: 
Purchase 57.461 45.090 102.551 1.9 
Unrestricted· 
Program: 
Rent 57.461 16.090 73.551 16.10 1.2 
Restricted+ 
Program: 
Purchase 55.333 49.520 104.853 2.18 
Restricted+ 
Program: 
Rent 55.333 15.491 70.824 20.45 .14 
Current 
Programs 50.902 50.902 3.4 
• Unrestricted land programs would not limit the amount of land purchased or rented in a 
particular region. 
+ Restricted land programs would limit the amount of land purchased or rented in a 
particular region. 
Information compiled from charts found in CAED #34 
annual program cost of $1.2 billion. Allowing for inflation and increases in 
land value, the program would still cost less than the $3.4 billion for the 
traditional program. The $2.2 billion difference could be redirected to the 
rural community and to assist people In the transition to industrial 
employment. To assist farmers being bought out, he proposed a concurrent 
retraining program, to aid their transition to employment in the non-
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agricultural. sector at the end of the ten year period. Heady and his allies 
claimed that even with extreme increases in land prices. the current 
inflation rate, and the interest rate, his program would cost less than 
continuing the traditional program. 14 
According to the linear programming model for the restricted land 
purchase program. an additional 49.5 million acres could be added to the 55 
million core acres. The 104.5 million acres would include pastures. land 
planted to minor crops and grass. if the program was carried out on a 
whole-fann-basis. The cost of a restricted land purchase program would be 
$21.8 billion over a ten year period. Rent or purchases of production rights 
of-the land would cost $20.24 per acre or $4.14 more than under an 
unrestricted program. The rise in total cost occurred because more 
productive land would be taken out of cultivation. IS 
In analyzing the continuation of current programs. the group 
examined only the cost and impact on major crops. Using linear 
programming, Heady projected that in 1965. 51 million acres would be set 
aside under the traditional land programs at a total cost of $3.4 billion per 
year. Cost increases to the U.S. 'lTeaswy would be expected "as yields rise 
faster than costs per acre, net returns rise and the government cost of 
bidding land out of production also rises." However. continuing traditional 
fann programs would not solve the surplus problem. At the end of ten 
years, land set aside would go back into production. and the government 
would continue to make payments. 16 
The second half of the Heady study explored alternative uses for the 
retired land in either purchase or rental programs. One alternative use 
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diverted the retired land to grass. trees and recreational areas. The second 
alternative pennitted the retired land to be used for beef production. 17 
Table 3.2 Land Totals for Increased Beef Production and Government Cost 
Projections for 1975 
Restricted 
Program: 
Expand· 
Maximum· 
Unrestricted 
Program: 
Expand· 
Maximum· 
Additional Cropland 
for Hay and Pasture 
(Thousand Acres) 
33.652 
·67.385 
32.224 
64.539 
Rent Payment 
(Dollars per Acre) 
10.43 
15.42 
14.62 
20.08 
Information compiled from charts found in CAED #34 
·See endnote 17 for definitions. 
Annual 
Prog 
Cost 
(millions) 
.94 
l.0 
l.2 
l.3 
Heady found that under an unrestricted program, where whole regions 
participated in the expanded beef program. open market beef pI1ces would be 
$3.00 less per hundred weight than under "nonnal" beef production because 
more cattle would go to market as grazing acres were expanded. Even with 
this decline, Heady and his colleagues projected the government's payment 
to participating farmers in the rental/production rights purchase program 
- would fall to $10.43 per acre under the expanded beef program. If a 
maximum beef program was instituted. the cost to the government, $15.42 
per acre, would still be less than under the unrestricted rent/production 
rights purchase program without increased beef production. Table 3.2 shows 
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the amount of additional acres needed for grazing. the rent payment for that 
land and the annual cost for each alternative. IS 
With a restricted regional land program there would be less land 
available for added beef production. thus the total cost of the program 
would be lower than the unrestricted program. Prices per hundred weight 
would be $5.80 lower than the "nonnal" beef production price. The 
government, under a restricted expanded beef program. would pay fanners 
$14.63 per acre. Under a maximum beef program the government would pay 
fanners $20.08 per acre.l9 
In the final analysis, Heady recognized the difficulty of rmding an easy 
solution to the problem of land retirement and the long-tenn effects of 
surplus production. Heady noted that current programs would continue to 
increase in the government's cost as technology increased the output per 
acre and more land would have to be set aside to control the surplus 
problem. In addition, the current programs did not provide aid to those 
rural communities suffering from the impact of a declining fann 
population. Heady claimed that his alternatives, whether restricted or 
unrestricted, would eventually cost less. and provide funds for use in rural 
communities. These land retirement programs, though, involved greater 
government control in an area of the economy where individualism was 
highly prized. The traditional program, also, had the advantage of being 
diffused throughout the nation, whereas the alternatives would be 
concentrated in specific regions.20 
Heady wanted to redirect the money saved through the alternative 
programs to communities in the concentrated retirement regions to assist in 
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easing the strain of the readjustment period. The lack of a rural policy as 
distinct from the traditional fann policy, caused Heady to note, 
"commercial fann policy does nothing to redress those who suffer most and 
directly from the transformation of agriculture and a reduction of the fann 
work force and country population . . . the workers replaced by the new 
forms of capital and rural merchants whose sales volume dwindles with the 
fann population." To address these concerns, Heady's two-prong rural 
social policy would compensate farmers and rural community members who 
were displaced by the change. Heady envisioned a program which would 
provide these individuals with training opportunities, money to pay for 
relocation and other such programs. The second prong of the program 
proposed consolidation of rural political units so as to build a wider tax 
base for rural towns to draw upon for maintaining basic community 
services.21 
Heady realized that the continuing substitution of capital-intensive 
mechanical power for family labor had also been given a boost by the high 
level of education farmers had been receiving through land-grant colleges 
and the extension service. These better educated fanners had the 
managerial skills necessary to operate at a higher level of credit and 
technology. As a result, poliCies were needed which would help individuals 
who were not able to perform at these higher levels move into industrial 
positions. A "survival of the fittest" selection would occur as the better 
skilled farmers would be able to stay profitable and all others would leave. 
For those leaving and for those staying, then, education was important. 
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Heady argued that rural chlldren were the greatest fann product and 
must be given the education and skills necessary to take advantage of non-
fann opportunities. The lack of educational opportunities in rural 
communities as a result of eroding tax bases prevented them from hiring the 
best teachers, maintaining existing structures, or building new facilities. 
The attitudes of parents and communities toward education, Heady 
believed, also influenced the performance of students in school. Heady 
strongly believed students had to flnish high school. Through "jmproved 
educational, counseling ... " he hoped more rural youth would stay to 
graduate. Heady proposed using governmental research money for a rural 
public education project. In addition, programs of education outside the 
Department of Agriculture could be used to bring uniformity to the 
experiences of urban youths and rural youths. Head Start, Job Corps, and 
other such programs held possible solutions for the improvement of the 
educational opportunities of rural youthS.22 
Farm laborers who left farming with little compensation faced an 
uncertain future because they lost their livelihood. 'While the public, 
through its development policy, strides fOIWard in replacing workers from 
agricultural and other activities of the rural community, it has no actual 
systematic compensation policy to retrain people, guide them to new jobs, 
and redress sacrifices they otherwise make." Heady's social policy would 
provide a variety of services to fanners. He envisioned a system of several 
stages through which an individual could move. The baSic stage would 
assist the displaced farmers in deciding whether or not to stay in farming. 
For those who decided to leave, Heady's policy would create severance pay, 
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retraining centers modeled along the lines of the GI on-the-job training 
program, and relocation centers which would offer information on living 
elsewhere and jobs available in that region. Heady suggested "programs 
could be implemented at the national level to establish Area Developmental 
Districts", which would bring "diversified industry" to areas of low income. 
This would siphon excess labor off the farm and into industrial jobs without 
depopulating the countryside.23 
For the older farmer, Heady proposed a series of monetary awards to 
leave fanning. For these individuals who lacked transferable skills, or 
wished not to partiCipate in the program " a system of retirement benefits 
and compensation payments" would help ease the transition. Heady's 
retirement program would be similar to the government's Social Security 
system or the pension plans of private companies.24 
Heady's program was complete in that it addressed the problems of 
agriculture and individuals living in rural areas. His permanent land 
retirement program offered a solution to reducing surpluses. The retraining 
and relocation programs sought to relieve the pressure unskilled farm 
laborers would put on the urban areas if they had to leave fanning. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: WOULD IT HAVE WORKED? 
Heady's proposed Positive Sum Concept was intended to bring a 
pennanent long-tenn solution to the problem of surpluses. Low incomes for 
fanners have been blamed on the surplus commodities depressing market 
prices. Fanners who wanted to get ahead and could finance it, adopted new 
methods and equipment to produce more. With more produce going to 
market, market prices declined and fanners had to produce more to 
maintain their level of income to cover their rising fixed production costs. 
The government tried to bolster fann income through price support 
programs, but the programs just treated the symptoms not the cause of the 
problem. Heady tried to get at the root cause as he understood it, the lack 
of adjustment by fanners to the expanding productivity of the acquired 
technology. Heady's plan would have severely reduced the land base 
available to technology, and reduced the number of farmers to share the 
market returns, thus fann income would be raised at less cost to the 
government than the traditional farm program. 
Price supports, through production quotas, and soil conservation set 
aside reserves were trademarks of the fann legislation of the 1930s. These 
ideas were put forth and supported by agriculture's special interest groups, 
and the congressmen from fann states who called themselves the "Farm 
Bloc" . Each piece of legislation was meant to aid in rais~g the level of 
farm income. WhUe the program benefitted the larger commercial fanners, 
it did little to aid the smaller scale fanners. Instead of removing unneeded 
and therefore excessive land and labor from agriculture, land and labor 
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remained ready to go back into production whenever a land reserve program 
or a production quota ended. 
Heady wanted to redefine the problem of agriculture. He saw the 
problem in terms of annual adjustments, which caused parts of each farm 
to be underemployed with government payments paying for the idleness of 
labor, land and equipment. Heady's Positive Sum Concept proposed 
adopting a new program based not on past performance, but instead on the 
quality of the land being fanned and the projected future needs of 
consumers. Heady developed fonnulas using linear programming models to 
assist him in selecting regions where such land retirements would be most 
beneficial. Heady aimed at removing marginal farmers and their farm 
laborers from agriculture into industrial jobs. Heady believed such 
readjustment would bring agriculture to a situation where the new 
technology could be used to the fullest and the resulting ·product could go to 
market at "fair" prices for farmers who would also have higher incomes. 
The rural aid portion of the proposed Positive Sum Concept, through 
retraining and relocation, aided fanners who voluntarily participated in the 
program. It also assisted rural communities which suffered from erosion of 
their population and tax base. Heady hoped to fund this component of his 
program with money saved from the land retirement program. 
Agricultural organizations appeared apprehensive over Heady's 
proposed permanent retirement of land. Farmer organizations voiced 
concern over reliance on a single program. The National Fanners Union was 
concerned about Heady's projection of a lower total net farm income as a 
result of his program. The November 1968 issue of the National Farmers 
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Uriion's Washington Newsletter briefly comme~ted on Heady's land 
retirement program saying that the national net farm income would drop 
$2.3 million. The National Fanners Union was also concerned with the 
effect of land retirement on rural communities. 1 
But it was the Ad Hoc Committee for a Better Agricultural Policy 
interpretation of CAED Report #34 which brought inquires about and 
criticism of Heady's work in analyzing farm programs. The Ad Hoc 
Committee had approached Heady and CAED with a fonnula it wanted run 
through a linear programming model. Heady agreed to run the model with 
the understanding that he could publish his own interpretation of the 
results as a CAED report. He published CAED Report #34 in April of 1969. 
This committee published its pamphlet entitled "1he Easement Approach to 
Agricultural Adjustment: an Interim Report" in April 1969 also and cited 
Heady as the economist responsible for the analysis. It was the Ad Hoc 
Committee's report that caused the National Cattlemen's Association to 
express concerns and demand Heady explain himself. In a series of letters, 
in 1969, between Heady and Bill House, President of the American National 
Cattlemen's Association and James Stevenson, President of the Iowa Beef 
Producers Association, Heady found himself explaining his analysis and 
defending his right to make it and to criticize current agricultural policy. In 
July of 1969, House requested .Heady, to "see fit to work with Iowa 
agriculture and not let surplus cr~p acreage be used to wreck the cattle and 
beefindustry." In his reply, Heady defended his right to study agricultural 
policy and sent House copies of CAED Report #32, CAED Report #34 and 
other CAED reports relevant to the topic, and he wrote "I look forward to 
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hearing from you again after you have seen our publications and made your 
personal appraisal of my objectivity." In August 1969, Headywrote 
Stevenson, "Frankly I believe you and others benefitted by having these 
figures computed so that you can know what the expected result is under 
each alternative." He offered to meet with Stevenson and to test the beef 
producers' suggested alternatives through the same linear model. 2 
Heady appeared to be taken aback by the criticism that he was trying 
to destroy the beef industry, when the results indicated that maximum beef 
production on land set aside from cultivation would not be beneficial. 
Heady appeared to have retreated behind a role of a detached observer, 
merely analyzing the current fann program and proposing alternatives to it. 
Heady would run alternatives through the models for any organizations, 
with the understanding that he could interpret the data and publish those 
interpretations in the form of a CAED report. The Ad Hoc Committee used 
the same data but with a different interpretation which resulted in the 
outCIY by the beef producers. The Ad Hoc Committee appears to have used 
Heady's name to bring attention to its work. The use of Heady's name in 
connection with this pamphlet brought serious allegations by the beef 
producers about the intent of Heady's works. In a final letter to Heady, 
Stevenson wrote, ''Your objectivity, scientific methods, summaries and 
findings, I believe are beyond reproach. I was concerned that perhaps you 
had laid aside your role as a scientist and was now attempting to influence 
policy . . ." Heady was able to disfuse a situation which might have 
damaged any further efforts in analyzing farm policy.3 
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The beef producers were not the only individuals to express 
reservations concerning Heady's work. In 1961, Heady came under attack 
from a fellow agricultural economist James G. Maddox. Heady along with 
Lee G. Burchinal had prepared and presented a paper entitled "The Concern 
with Goals and Values in Agriculture" at a CARD conference on Goals and 
Values in Agrict.iJ.tural Policy. Their paper outlined the conflict between 
goals and values in development of farm policy. Maddox was the discussant 
for the Heady- Burchinal paper. In his discussion, Maddox credited Heady 
and his co-author for attempting to demonstrate the impact goals and 
values have in the arena of policy-making. But he criticized the authors for 
trying to eliminate policy-making conflict by being too general in their 
statements of goals and values. 
Heady came under fire later in the 1960s when a book reviewer in the 
American Jo~ of Agricultural Economics, Gene D. Sullivan wrote that the 
book, A Primer on Food , Agriculture and Public Policy, offered nothing "new or 
unique" but it did offer pOints of disagreement. The point that bothered 
Sullivan the most was the arbitrary manner in which Heady set a poverty 
line for deciding which farm people were poor and should be removed from 
the land. Sullivan wrote, " ... many so determined 'poverty stricken 
families' have the finanCial means of acquiring the mechanical conveniences 
that they are pitied for not having. They Simply have a . . . preference for 
saving. How much beyond adequate nutrition, clothing, and shelter must 
families have before they can escape this poverty classification?" Sullivan 
was not convinced the retraining programs would actually prevent 
dislocated farm families from going on welfare rolls once they moved to the 
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urban center. In fact, Sullivan thought it would add an extra burden to 
existing problems.4 
Were Heady's permanent land retirement alternatives too radical to be 
acceptable to the general public? When he originally proposed the Positive 
Sum Concept, land ownership, control of one's own destiny, and the 
freedom to plant whatever a farmer chose were still key ideals in American 
agriculture. It was hard for people to understand how buying producing 
rights, and not using them or purchasing a person's farm to keep it idle, 
and forcing a farmer to go into the industrial s"ector were good. While 
Heady's plan would cut back on the number of producing farms, and the 
amount of land under cultivation, it also reduced the" number of family 
farms. Family farms have been the mythical cornerstone of American 
agriculture. 
Heady believed it would be difficult to change agricultural policy. The 
fann organizations had individual agendas and compromise between 
organizations would mean departing from those agendas. As with all new 
proposed programs, fann organizations would either support Heady's 
proposal or oppose it. In the case of Heady's program the American Farm 
Bureau supported it because it favored the eventual elimination of 
government involvement in agriculture. The National Farmers' Union 
opposed it because it would eliminate small farmers and have a negative 
impact on small towns. Heady's program would have entailed compromise 
among these two organizations and the other agricultural organizations, 
but with an agricultural program in place, these organizations did not have 
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to come together to support parts of the Heady proposal which agreed with 
their agendas. 5 
Heady's long-term solution also ignored the realities of an American 
political system that would rather maintain a program than spend time 
bringing together opposing parties to work out a new policy and program. 
While the existing program, did have major flaws, it worked for the most 
part. Participating farmers in all regions of the country received payments. 
They could continue to farm, the government did not require them to quit to 
receive payment. The one major flaw was the favoritism of commercial 
farmers over small scale farmers. The agricultural program in place during 
the 1960s and even today, had its roots in the legisl~tion of the 1930s. The 
perSistence of the major features of the program, may be due in part to the 
establishment of a bureaucracy in the Department of Agriculture which had 
a vested ·interest in continuity of program and funding level. 
Heady's program would have called for a major reorganization of the 
Department of Agriculture and its purpose. It would have had to change 
from a lending agent to a mortgage agent. The functions of education and 
outreach would have had to be shared with other departments in adapting 
their programs to agriculture. The Department would have to maintain its. 
functions in research and development for agriculture and had to add to its 
charge the job of poliCing the remaining farms for indications of increased 
production so that further removal of marginal land could take place as 
production began to outpace domestic and foreign demand. 
One of the flaws of traditional agricultural policy was the lack of 
projection into the future. Payment formulas were based on past demands 
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and income levels offanners. The AAA of 1933 and 1938 depended on a 
parity index which compared current buying power of agricultural 
commodities to the buying power of those commodities in the period 
between 1910-1914. Fanners' acreage allotments were based on their 
regional crop production perfonnance of the previous ten years. Heady's 
policy took into consideration future growth of agricultural productivity 
through the adoption of new technology. His programs used the data 
generated through linear programming models to make recommendations 
concerning the size of the land retirement program, and the location of the 
regions for major land retirement. Heady never published a figure of how 
many fanners and farms were involved with his program. It was the same 
problem he had with the goals and values. Heady generalized the program 
to a point where it ignored the conflict involved. His arbitrary manner in 
setting levels of income and other monetary figures he used ignored the 
human factor, which does not respond according to economic theory, such 
as psychic rewards of being one's own boss, working outdoors and working 
with livestock. Heady relied upon the same type of constraints the 
Department of Agriculture worked under, neither party had a crystal ball. 
The difference between Heady and the Department was the use of the 
information and interpretation of the data. 
Any type of future forecasting had to be done with an understanding 
that there were limitations. In the case of the Positive Sum Concept such 
limitations carried Significant weight in the implementation of the program. 
Incorrect forecasting could result in even greater surpluses of commodities 
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on the market or severe shortages of basic commodities. This had to be one 
of the major drawbacks of the proposal. 
Heady's program encouraged intensified farming of the land which 
remained in production. This included the use of fertilizers, herbicides, 
intercropping, and rotation of crops to increase productivity. Even with the 
rotation of crops and use of chemicals, the soil of these remaining farms 
might have lost its ability to produce. Heady did not make provisions for 
this possibility. If land put into permanent retirement was brought back 
into production to substitute for this land, the premise of Heady's program 
would be destroyed. Heady's program would be a long-term version of the 
annual adjustment program with a twist. The government would probably 
decide which land would go back into production. Farmers who were 
transferred from working fanns with modem facilities would have to receive 
some type of compensation for setting up new facilities and bringing 
improvements to the idle land. There is the other side of this concern. 
With the advent of new technology and improved farming methods, 
productivity could increase to the point where more land would have to be 
taken out of production. So conceivably this program could become a 
continuous program, perhaps not an annual program but maybe a once a 
decade type program. 
The rural community component of Heady's program was dependent 
on the complete adoption of the land program. A program which combined 
annual land adjustments and permanent land retirement might not have 
saved enough money to be diverted into rural community programs. Thus 
retraining and relocation would continue to be deficient or carried out by 
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agencies outside the Department of Agriculture. These agencies had other 
mandates and finanCial restraints which might have hindered the efforts in 
rural areas. The rural component also encouraged consolidation of rural 
communities and services as a way to strengthen public services. 
Consolidation has not been well received by rural areas. Although Heady 
predicated the need to consolidate towns, school districts and even 
extension area offices, these changes came with resistance and political 
maneuvers to foU them. Heady was born in a small community in 
Nebraska. He should have realized the importance of rural communities to 
the areas farmers and to the people who lived in the towns. Heady's 
program based on stark facts and mathematical models ignored human 
feelings and did not give individuals choices of alternatives. 
Heady's program was idealistic. Heady believed that agricultural 
poliCies and programs had been based on past programs or assumptions 
without suffiCient study of the impact on fanners and rural communities. 
Unfortunately, Heady did not cany through on his complaint. In the 
studies, articles and speeches read for this thesis, Heady did not give a 
number of farmers and fanns his program would effect. This flaw seriously 
damages the credibility of the proposal. It also gives rise to the speculation 
that Heady was merely playing with linear programming models and was not 
trying to influence policy making. This speculation is probably accurate in 
its conclUSion, yet in Heady's correspondence there are letters indicating he 
had met with Department of Agriculture offiCials, and he did serve on 
several White House committees looking at the economy as a whole. He 
was meeting with the public officials who created the poliCies and programs, 
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although his role was as an economist reporting his fmdings from the 
analysis he had completed on a subject. There is no evidence that he was 
presenting his plan to the officials during these meetings. Certainly in 
speeches he delivered to various fann organizations, such as the National 
Farm Institute, the National SUo Association and the Fannland Industries, 
Heady alluded to his ideas but the lack of correspondence from these groups 
hinders any attempts to gauge their response to the Positive Sum Concept. 
As Heady noted it was easier to patch up the old, instead of trying to 
develop the new. He hoped these studies, based on data, would start 
discussions among farmers, politicians, and others who would write the 
agricultural poliCies. In an article in the Kansas City Star, Roderick 
Turnbull, the agricultural editor for the paper, commented on CARD Report 
#34, writing" The report while it may not be the Bible . . . deals almost 
entirely with the economics of the situation .. certainly can form the basis 
for an educated discussion." Heady would have hoped the results of such a 
discussion would benefit both farmers and other rural community members 
in a positive sum manner.6 
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